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Abstract – Biodiversity undergoes unprecedented erosion despite important services it provides. 32 
This is considered evidence that biodiversity is undervalued. Biodiversity valuation is 33 
accordingly a prominent issue in the literature. Economic valuations are, however, criticized. 34 
Numerous alternatives have been introduced. Most of them involve participatory protocols 35 
aimed at producing high-quality results. Being time-consuming and expensive, it is difficult to 36 
implement and reproduce them at a large scale. We produce an easily reproducible, inexpensive 37 
survey methodology to measure impartial preference for biodiversity. We implement it in 38 
Switzerland through a mail-based survey. Our result is that biodiversity should be ranked after 39 
retirement schemes and public transportation, but before relations with foreign countries, order 40 
and security, and culture and leisure in the expanses of the State. Current expenses therefore 41 
substantially underestimate the value that Swiss people grant to biodiversity. Our new method 42 
is a viable alternative to standard economic valuation. Given the impartiality achieved, at least 43 
in the Swiss political context our estimate can be used by decision makers to assess the 44 
legitimacy of conservation programs or to gauge public support. At a philosophical level, our 45 
measure is relevant for public policies because it captures the stances that people take when 46 
they participate in public decisions.  47 
4 
 
1. Introduction 48 
Biodiversity is “the variety of living organisms; the biological complexes in which they occur, 49 
and the ways in which they interact with each other and the physical environment” (Groves et 50 
al. 2002). Over the past ten years, biodiversity valuation has become a prominent issue in the 51 
economic (Bartkowski et al. 2015), ecological (Laurila-Pant et al. 2015) and philosophical 52 
(Maclaurin & Sterelny 2008) literature. 53 
This prominence stems from two observations. On the one hand, measures of biodiversity are 54 
correlated with measures of ecosystem functioning (Schmid et al. 2009), many of which provide 55 
“ecosystem services” (Quijas et al. 2012, Mace et al. 2012). On the other hand, biodiversity is 56 
under increasing pressure and undergoes unprecedented rates of erosion (Butchart et al. 2010). 57 
The fact that biodiversity is being eroded despite the services it provides is considered evidence 58 
that biodiversity is undervalued (TEEB 2010). Economic valuations promise to overcome this 59 
problem by informing environmental policies through:  60 
- environmental accounting (Cobb & Cobb 1994); 61 
- rationalization of investments for the protection of species and/or habitats under: 62 
o national legislations such as the Swiss law on the protection of nature and natural 63 
landscapes (admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19660144/index.html), 64 
o supranational legislation such as Natura 2000 in Europe (CEC 1992), 65 
o international agreements such as the International Convention on the protection 66 
of Biodiversity (Nijkamp et al. 2008), 67 
- more generally, improvements of the allocation of conservation funds (Scharks & 68 
Masuda 2016). 69 
The economic methods concerned are predominantly based on individual willingness to pay 70 
(iWTP), and are classically divided in two types (Bartkowski et al. 2015): 71 
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- stated preference methods are survey-based inquiries encompassing contingent 72 
valuation, where respondents state their iWTP for an environmental entity or project, 73 
and choice experiments, where iWTP is inferred from choices between scenarios; 74 
- revealed preference methods, which use observation of behavior, mainly on markets, to 75 
infer iWTP . 76 
The notion that these iWTP-based methods can inform environmental policies is debated (Ives 77 
& Kendal 2014, Jax et al. 2014, Spash 2012) with respect to two issues: (1) informational basis 78 
and (2) aggregation procedure. 79 
(1) In terms of informational basis, the relevance of iWTP is questioned on four counts. 80 
(1.1) iWTP is sensitive to knowledge, and individuals are often poorly 81 
knowledgeable about scientific issues such as biodiversity (Munro & Hanley 82 
2001). 83 
(1.2) iWTP is sensitive to income and socio-economic status (Meinard et al. 84 
2016), implying that the richer one is, the more influential one can be on iWTP-85 
based decisions. 86 
(1.3) Despite evidence that respondents can act as committed citizens by 87 
modulating their stated iWTP (Ami et al. 2014, Martínez-Espiñeira 2006), iWTP 88 
elicitation arguably confines people to their role as consumers rather than 89 
citizens (Anderson 1993, Sagoff 2008, Sarkar 2005). 90 
(1.4) iWTP measurements ignore the motives (including social norms and ethical 91 
motivations) behind actions and statements, which impairs their usefulness for 92 
public policies (Spash et al. 2009, Liebe et al. 2011). 93 
(2) In terms of the aggregation procedure, the relevance of iWTP is questioned on two 94 
counts. 95 
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(2.1) Many methods aggregate iWTP through summations and therefore endorse 96 
utilitarianism (Lo & Spash 2012), an ethical doctrine whose relevance has long 97 
been debated (Rawls 1971, Kymlicka 2002). 98 
(2.2) According to the theory of deliberative democracy (Chappell 2012), by 99 
confining aggregation to a mathematical exercise, these methods bypass the crux 100 
of legitimate collective decision-making: the public discussions through which 101 
people form their positions about public policy. 102 
In the wake of these debates, the main methodological tool introduced is deliberative monetary 103 
valuation (DMV) (Kenter et al. 2015, Randhir & Shriver 2009, Spash 2007). Various 104 
approaches to DMV tackle different deficiencies of standard iWTP-based methods (Bunse et 105 
al. 2015). Empirical studies mainly aim at improving the estimates produced by “facilitating 106 
the construction of well-informed and rational preferences” (Bunse et al. 2015, p. 91), and 107 
therefore mainly tackle deficiency (1.1) and to some extent (2.2). Theoretical studies tackle all 108 
the deficiencies by questioning the standard economic theoretical framework, using various 109 
interpretations of the deliberative democracy literature (in particular, Bunce et al. 2015 single 110 
out Spash & Lo 2012 as defending a distinctively pluralist interpretation). 111 
The present study aims to contribute to the development of alternatives to iWTP-based methods, 112 
not by developing a new DMV approach, but by assessing whether a measure of reasonably 113 
impartial preference for biodiversity can be reached through an easily reproducible, inexpensive 114 
survey methodology. 115 
This aim has two aspects. The first aspect is that we aim at capturing “impartial preferences”—116 
that is, preference of people focusing on biodiversity per se rather than on their personal 117 
situation. Indeed, most conservation actions result in different costs and benefits for various 118 
people. Therefore, if they take their personal situation into account, some agents strongly 119 
favoring biodiversity might downplay this attitude because they think that conservation policies 120 
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might have detrimental consequences on their personal situation. Conversely, some agents not 121 
concerned with biodiversity might express a positive attitude because they expect positive 122 
impacts on themselves. Here we want to focus on preference for biodiversity per se. 123 
The second aspect of our aim is to produce an easily reproducible, reasonably inexpensive 124 
survey method. Indeed, the current alternatives to standard iWTP-based methods such as DMV 125 
involve dense protocols, where participants are asked to work together for several hours or days. 126 
For example, Hattam et al. (2015) organized a citizen’s workshop to assess the ecosystem 127 
services provided by a sandbank. To set up their jury with 19 members, they implemented a 128 
recruitment procedure, invited experts to explain the stakes of the exercise, and orchestrated 129 
deliberations. Such protocols produce high-quality results, but because they are time-130 
consuming and expensive, it is difficult to reproduce them at a large scale. Accordingly, Bunse 131 
et al. (2015) highlight the development of larger-scale investigations as a pivotal challenge for 132 
the future of DMV. That is why we aim at developing a more quantitative method. 133 
This article is organized as follows. The core theoretical elements structuring the protocol are 134 
developed in the “Methods” section. The “Results” section presents empirical findings. 135 
Additional theoretical elements useful to interpret them are presented in the “Discussion”. 136 
 137 
2. Methods 138 
2.1. Theoretical framework 139 
2.1.1. The literature on preference for redistribution as role-model 140 
We developed a survey-based approach, inspired by the economic literature on preferences for 141 
redistribution. One can distinguish two approaches in this literature. The first uses data from 142 
international survey programs such as the World Values Survey to identify the determinants of 143 
people’s attitudes towards redistributive policies (e.g. Alesina & La Ferrara 2005, Fong 2001). 144 
The second approach, largely inspired by the work of Rawls (1971), encompasses theories of 145 
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“extended” (Harsanyi 1977), “laundered” (Goodin 1986), “fundamental” (Kolm 2005) or 146 
“abstract” (Meinard & Grill 2011) preferences. These theories claim that, in order to express 147 
their preferences for redistribution, people have to abstract from their personal situation. Indeed, 148 
if they take their personal situation into account, rich people are incited to oppose redistribution 149 
while poorer ones are incited to favor it. Empirical studies aiming to capture preferences for 150 
redistribution therefore have to embed an “impartialization” (Kolm 2005) protocol, leading 151 
respondents to abstract from their personal situation (Clément & Serra 2001). An illustrative 152 
classic impartialization protocol was implemented by Frohlich & Oppenheimer (1992). 153 
Working in small groups, they asked participants to choose one among four principles of 154 
redistribution (maximization of minimal income, maximization of mean income, maximization 155 
of mean income within limits in income disparity, maximization of mean income subject to a 156 
lower limit for the minimal income), in view of the distribution of income that each principle 157 
would produce among eight classes of income. Each individual was randomly assigned to one 158 
class, but did not know which one until the principle was chosen. At the end, each player 159 
received a payoff determined by the principle chosen and the class to which s/he was assigned. 160 
In this protocol, the players cannot take their personal situations as players into account to 161 
decide their move, because when playing they don’t know the class to which they have been 162 
assigned. Numerous other examples are presented by Gaertner & Schokkaert (2012). 163 
If the logic behind impartialization is thought through to the end, it can be criticized for reducing 164 
agents to “unemcumbered selves”, deprived from personal attachments and shared meanings, 165 
and therefore incapable to have preference (this criticism was originally raised against Rawls’s 166 
theory: see Kymlicka 2002). Unemcumbered selves are rhetorical specters, but in concrete 167 
terms this criticism means that the personal situation and history of real-life respondents can 168 
have a deep effect on their values, from which even the best imaginable impartialization 169 
protocol is powerless to abstract. Impartialization is hence better conceived as what Sen (2009) 170 
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terms a “comparative”, as opposed to a “transcendental” notion: thorough impartialization is 171 
elusive, but certain preferences can be more impartialized than others. 172 
2.1.2. Application to biodiversity in a large-scale approach 173 
Beyond redistribution, the above-explained logic applies to any issue having redistributive 174 
implications, and in particular to biodiversity. Since conservation actions can have effects on 175 
personal situations, admitting that people can anticipate (imperfectly) that such effects can exist, 176 
identifying their preferences for biodiversity per se requires them to abstract from these 177 
anticipations. Our survey therefore had to embed an impartialization protocol. 178 
Most impartialization protocols are, however, small-scale role-playings that produce high-179 
quality data but are expensive, time-consuming and limited in scale (Clement et al. 2008). In 180 
contrast, here we introduce a new type of impartialization protocol which is simple and easily 181 
reproducible. It is based on the “democracy/contractualism analogy”. This refers to 182 
philosophical theories claiming that democratic procedures can be seen as models of 183 
impartialization protocols (Howard 2013). This philosophical notion is to some extent 184 
corroborated by empirical findings: although predicting political choices on the basis of social 185 
classes has long been central to political science, recent studies argue that political choices are 186 
increasingly independent of socio-demographic determinants (Ogien & Laugier 2014). 187 
Taking advantage of this “democracy/contractualism analogy” to design a new type of 188 
impartialization protocol is intrinsically worth testing. But it is all the more relevant in a study 189 
of biodiversity. Indeed, it is arguably built into the very notion of biodiversity that decision-190 
making on it is unavoidably political (Meinard & Mestrallet 2014, Sagoff 2008). Being 191 
deprived of this political dimension, standard economic valuations “of biodiversity” are in fact 192 
valuations of biodiversity proxies. By contrast, by implementing a protocol fleshing out the 193 
democracy/contractualism analogy, one captures this political dimension. In a somewhat 194 
similar vein, Schläpfer (2016) advocated a new economic valuation method (“democratic 195 
valuation”—DV) based on democratic principles, stressing important strengths as compared to 196 
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iWTP. In particular, the emblematic democratic aggregation rule—the simple majority rule—197 
proves more robust to strategic answers, more acceptable for respondents and more credible 198 
than welfare economic aggregations. Schläpfer (2016), however, does not explore 199 
impartialization, his empirical applications are embedded in standard iWTP surveys, and they 200 
focus on concrete projects rather than on biodiversity per se. He therefore turns a blind eye 201 
towards important features of protocols based on democratic principles. 202 
By contrast, here we design a large-scale survey formatted to model a democratic political 203 
choice and we assess its credential to capture preferences for biodiversity per se. 204 
2.1.3. Empirical assessment 205 
We empirically assess whether this protocol works as an impartialization device. Our 206 
assessment has two dimensions—impartiality and impartialization—each involving important 207 
methodological choices. 208 
2.1.3.1. Impartiality assessment 209 
Impartiality can be defined in so-called “internalist” terms: preferences are internalist impartial 210 
when agents do not take into account their personal situation when identifying and expressing 211 
them. But it can also be understood in an “externalist” approach: preferences are externalist 212 
impartial when they are independent from socio-demographic status.  213 
Externalist impartiality is harder to achieve than internalist impartiality. Indeed, even if 214 
respondents do not take their personal status into account (and preferences are therefore 215 
internalist impartial), answers can remain correlated with socio-demographic status (and are 216 
therefore not externalist impartial). This can happen, for example, because socio-economic 217 
status had a deep effect in their psychological history and the formation of their values. But 218 
externalist impartiality is easier to measure than internalist impartiality, because it can be 219 
assessed by studying correlations between responses and socio-demographic status. By 220 
contrast, assessing internalist impartiality is a complex psychological task. 221 
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Because it is easier to measure and harder to achieve, externalist impartiality can be used as 222 
criterion to assess internalist impartiality. This is our approach here. 223 
Another methodological issue is whether impartiality should be assessed question by question 224 
or at the scale of the whole questionnaire. A global assessment is theoretically difficult because 225 
it is unclear how impartiality of responses to a given question can outweigh partiality of 226 
responses to another. However, a question-by-question assessment is also questionable. Indeed, 227 
one might argue that it is psychologically implausible that, within a single questionnaire, 228 
respondents switch from impartial to partial stances and back again. In this article, we do not 229 
take a rigid stance on these issues. We implement statistical models on a question-by-question 230 
basis and discuss in more informal terms the picture at the scale of the whole questionnaire. 231 
2.1.3.2. Impartialization assessment 232 
Impartialization assessment aims to determine whether the protocol has a causal effect in 233 
rendering preferences more impartial than iWTP. Five approaches can be envisaged. 234 
(1) Embed a iWTP elicitation procedure within the questionnaire. This would allow 235 
comparing how a given respondent answers differently to a iWTP-based question and 236 
to a question integrated in the impartialization protocol. However, iWTP-based 237 
questions arouse numerous protest non-responses (Milanesi 2010). Integrating a iWTP-238 
based question in our questionnaire would therefore probably lower the response rate, 239 
and the resulting sample would be biased towards people accepting iWTP-based 240 
approaches. This would therefore impose very high costs in terms of quantity and 241 
quality of data. Besides, given that iWTP-based approaches encompass numerous 242 
methods (Alberini & Kahn 2009), a comparative approach within a questionnaire would 243 
open endless debates about whether it sheds light on iWTP in general or on the specific 244 
method implemented.  245 
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(2) Implement two parallel questionnaires: one embodying the impartialization protocol 246 
and the other a iWTP elicitation procedure. This approach is immune from the risk of 247 
biasing responses. But the subpopulation answering the two questionnaires would likely 248 
be different, rendering it impossible to disentangle this effect from the impartialization 249 
effect. And like approach (1), the comparison would arouse inconclusive debates. 250 
(3) Implement an experimental approach precisely monitoring whether and how 251 
respondents modify their answers as a response to the impartialization protocol. This 252 
would involve setting the questionnaire in a small-scale experimental format, 253 
incompatible with our ambition to produce a large-scale, relatively inexpensive 254 
methodology. 255 
(4) Compare the results of our questionnaire with the ones of iWTP-based valuations. In 256 
the current state of the literature, this is hardly feasible, as illustrated by Bartkowski et 257 
al. (2015)’s comprehensive review. They identified only 7 studies (among 123) focused 258 
on biodiversity in general rather than on a specific proxy. One of them is embedded in 259 
a deliberative protocol and the other six are focused on specific ecosystems. None can 260 
be used as benchmark for our purposes. 261 
(5) Use a theoretical, incentive-based benchmark. A more modest approach is to use, more 262 
informally, a coarse incentive-based theoretical benchmark delineating what a partial 263 
response would look like, and compare actual responses with this benchmark. 264 
Approaches (1) and (2) appear unpromising. Ultimately, a perfectly satisfactory assessment 265 
would involve parallel implementations of approaches (3), (4) and (5). Given the data 266 
limitations to which we are subject, we limit ourselves to a modest implementation of approach 267 
(5).  268 
 269 
2.2. Technical implementation 270 
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We carried out a questionnaire study in Switzerland. The Swiss political context (Cormon 2015) 271 
is particularly convenient for the implementation of our approach. Indeed, this political system 272 
is very close to a direct democracy, in the sense that referenda are very often used, both for 273 
Constitutional changes and for more day-to-day changes in law. “Popular initiatives” and 274 
“votations” are widely used instruments of direct democracy through which citizens can make 275 
bottom-up decisions about governance and policies. This system applies at three nested levels 276 
(federal state, cantons and municipalities). Democracy, understood in a sense that gives 277 
prominent importance to voting and to the simple majority rule, is therefore especially well-278 
entrenched in Switzerland. 279 
In October 2011, we sent 1,000 questionnaires, in a French version, to a random sample of 280 
households in the canton of Neuchâtel and another 1,000 questionnaires, in German, to a 281 
random sample in the canton of Zürich. The samples were drawn from the Directories 282 
Phonebook (www.local.ch). Our documents (supplemental data S1) follow a recommended 283 
format (Kanninen 2007, Alberini & Kahn 2009). 284 
The envelope contained an introduction, the questionnaire and a stamped envelope. The 285 
introduction gave the opportunity to send it back without answering the questionnaire. 286 
The introduction specified that the questionnaire was part of scientific research aiming to assess 287 
how the Swiss society valued biodiversity. It stressed that, although independent from political 288 
parties, its results should provide information for policy-makers to better understand the 289 
importance granted by Swiss people to biodiversity. This was meant to focus respondents’ 290 
attention on the value of biodiversity per se and its political dimension. 291 
The questionnaire contained three parts. Part 1 summarized knowledge about biodiversity and 292 
clarified that it did not advocate any environmental position. It emphasized that protecting 293 
biodiversity requires costly, organized, cooperative efforts, so as to point out the potential 294 
political implications of responses. 295 
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Part 2 contained the valuation questions. The central question (II in Table 1: “In your opinion, 296 
how important is biodiversity when compared with these various sectors?”) asked respondents 297 
to express the importance they granted to biodiversity. We presented the Swiss budgetary 298 
allocation to five tasks (retirement schemes, public transportation, relations with foreign 299 
countries, order and security, culture and leisure), listed in this order according to the percentage 300 
of federal budget allocated to them (according to administrative databases: www.efd.admin.ch), 301 
and asked where biodiversity should be ranked in importance in relation to these sectors. 302 
The formulation in terms of budgetary allocation conveys that concrete, costly collective 303 
actions are at stake. The question had to take into account political and economic constraints, 304 
in particular the fact that political decision-making cannot change budgetary repartitions 305 
overnight. This is why respondents were not asked to rank the sectors as they see fit, but rather 306 
to rank biodiversity conservation relative to these fixed items. 307 
Notice that, by expressing importance in terms of relative budgetary ranking, we take the term 308 
“importance” in a specific sense. One can take some costless things to be more important than 309 
all the things to which a State allots its budget. Our questionnaire does not take “importance” 310 
in this sense. In yet another understanding, one could argue that, given that the various sectors 311 
have different operating costs, a more meaningful measure of relative importance is in terms of 312 
the quantity of service that citizens want for the various sectors. The relative budgetary ranking 313 
is in that case derived from applying sector-specific budget requirements to chosen quantities. 314 
The specific understanding of “importance” used in our valuation question is therefore only one 315 
possible understanding (which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results). 316 
Our choice of sectors is largely arbitrary. They are not the most important ones in the budget. 317 
For example, health insurance accounted for more than foreign relations in expenses in the 318 
original data. Using the five most important sectors would have biased the responses by 319 
suggesting that biodiversity must be ranked among the six most important sectors. We have 320 
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therefore chosen five sectors that span across the spectrum of the orders of magnitude of 321 
expenses by sector. This approach, however, leaves many options available. We chose five 322 
sectors intuitively epitomizing emblematic issues of political debates. Framing the question in 323 
these terms was therefore likely to lead respondents to associate their answers with realistic 324 
collective choices. Notice also that this list contains both sectors corresponding to benefits 325 
accruing in a diffuse way to everyone (e.g. relations with foreign countries) and sectors with 326 
clear beneficiaries (e.g. retirement schemes). This is because the point is not to interrogate 327 
respondents about issues on which they do not have a personal stake, but rather to lead them to 328 
take an impersonal stance on issues on which they can have personal stakes. 329 
Notice also that some of the current expenses of the State could be interpreted as falling within 330 
the category “biodiversity”: there is a sector “protection of the environment” in databases, and 331 
part of the State expenses devoted to “research” finance research on biodiversity. Furthermore, 332 
in Switzerland farmers benefit from direct payments if they protect biodiversity. Therefore, one 333 
might object that the current position of the sector “biodiversity” should have been mentioned. 334 
This was not our approach because the current ranking would have been a salient point 335 
attracting responses. 336 
We also emphasized that responses would be aggregated according to the majority rule like in 337 
a democratic vote (first-past-the-post), which recalled the link between answers and political 338 
choices in a democratic setting. Given that the aggregation mode is one to which respondents 339 
are accustomed (especially in Switzerland), one can assume that pointing it helped respondents 340 
to understand how their voice could be translated into collective political choices. 341 
Following question II, question IV strengthened the link between biodiversity valuation and its 342 
potential consequences by asking how respondents would contribute to the costs of 343 
conservation. Placing this question after the valuation question was crucial, because if placed 344 
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the opposite sequence, respondents would have been incited to focus on anticipations of 345 
redistributive effects. 346 
Further questions in part 2 allowed respondents to assess whether the formulation of the 347 
questions about valuation and financing allowed them to express their opinion in a convenient 348 
way (Questions III and V). Despite the admitted importance of understanding motives behind 349 
responses to questionnaires (Spash et al. 2009, Liebe et al. 2011), we purportedly did not 350 
include more precise questions concerning motivations. This is because our primary aim in this 351 
pilot implementation was to assess the feasibility of our protocol and its credential as an 352 
impartializing device. Adding questions to capture motivations would have lengthened the 353 
questionnaire, and hence could have lowered the response rate, thereby affecting our primary 354 
empirical aim. And the payoff would have been uncertain, because our format is very different 355 
form deliberative settings such as discussions groups, which are admitted to be the most 356 
convenient to capture such information (Bunse et al. 2015). In the discussion, we come back to 357 
the importance of integrating such questions in further implementation. 358 
Part 3 contained questions about socio-demographic attributes of respondents. 359 
 360 
3. Results 361 
The proportion of complete responses was 21.7% (433 out of 1994), which is relatively high 362 
(Whitehead 2009) and sufficient for a meaningful quantitative analysis. The global rate of 363 
responses, including short responses containing only the first page, was 29.7%. Among the 364 
short responses, 20% stated that they were not interested in biodiversity and 31% that they were 365 
against the use of questionnaires. These purportedly short questions do not provide easily 366 
interpretable results. But at least they testify that numerous respondents had a protest attitude 367 
towards our survey that future implementations could strive to characterize.  368 
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A great majority of respondents were rather or perfectly convinced by the arguments for the 369 
preservation of biodiversity (68.9%; Question I: “In your opinion, how convincing are the 370 
arguments [for the preservation of biodiversity] mentioned above?”). Regarding Questions III 371 
and V, most individuals felt that Questions II and IV enabled them to rather well or perfectly 372 
express their opinion (70.7% and 71.0%, respectively). 373 
The main result, which is the aggregate response to the valuation question according to the 374 
majority rule, indicates that biodiversity should be ranked third in budget allocation among the 375 
six presented tasks (Table 1; Question II). Almost two thirds of respondents stated that 376 
conservation should be financed through reallocating money from the existing budget (64%) 377 
rather than through an increase in taxes or a combination of the two (Question IV). This suggests 378 
that respondents took seriously the monetary implications of their responses. 379 
 380 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. The variables are labeled by the number corresponding to the 
question in the survey. 
Dependent variable (answers to questions in the questionnaire) Number Percentage (%) 
I. Opinion concerning the arguments to preserve biodiversity 
1. perfectly convincing 
2. rather convincing 
3. interesting, but insufficient 
4. rather weak 
5. not convincing at all 
o no response 
434 
124 
175 
92 
6 
4 
33 
100 
28.6 
40.3 
21.2 
1.4 
0.9 
7.6 
II. Rank of biodiversity in the state budget 
1. 1st position, before all the others  
2. 2nd position, after retirement schemes 
3. 3rd position, after public transportation 
4. 4th position, after relations with foreign countries 
5. 5th position, after order and security 
6. last position, after culture and leisure 
o no response 
434 
48 
77 
105 
63 
94 
32 
15 
100 
11.1 
17.7 
24.2 
14.5 
21.7 
7.4 
3.4 
III. Opinion on the formulation of question II 
1. perfectly 
2. rather well, but I would have more to say 
3. don't know 
4. rather badly 
5. not at all 
o no response 
434 
129 
178 
65 
45 
12 
5 
100 
29.7 
41.0 
15.0 
10.4 
2.8 
1.1 
IV. Modalities of financing 
1. rise taxes 
434 
4 
100 
0.9 
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2. diminish state interventions in other domains 
3. both 
o no answer 
278 
136 
16 
64.1 
31.3 
3.7 
V. Opinion on the formulation of question IV 
1. perfectly 
2. rather well, but I would have more to say 
3. don't know 
4. rather badly 
5. not at all 
o no response 
434 
137 
171 
50 
49 
15 
12 
100 
31.6 
39.4 
11.5 
11.3 
3.4 
2.8 
Socio-demographic variables 
  
VI. Age 
o 18-25 
o 26-35 
o 36-45 
o 46-55 
o 56-65 
o 66-75 
o 76 or more 
o no response 
434 
5 
16 
39 
46 
46 
51 
37 
194 
100 
1.2 
3.7 
9.0 
10.6 
10.6 
11.7 
8.5 
44.7 
VII. Civil status 
1. married 
2. single  
3. divorcee 
4. widowed 
o no response 
434 
265 
82 
66 
18 
3 
100 
61.1 
18.9 
15.2 
4.1 
0.7 
VIII. Number of children 
1. none 
2. one 
3. two  
4. three or more 
o no response 
434 
117 
58 
163 
95 
1 
100 
27.0 
13.4 
37.6 
21.8 
0.2 
IX. Education 
1. apprenticeship 
2. "maturité gymnasiale" (qualification to enter university) 
3. two years of university studies 
4. three years or more 
5. no education 
o no responses 
434 
222 
46 
31 
122 
2 
11 
100 
51.2 
10.6 
7.1 
28.1 
0.5 
2.5 
X. Amount of taxes paid last year 
1. less than 2 000 CHF  
2. between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF  
3. between 6000 and 10 000 CHF  
4. between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF  
5. between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF  
6. between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 
7. more than 25 000 CHF  
o no response 
434 
25 
72 
91 
80 
40 
33 
80 
13 
100 
5.8 
16.6 
21.0 
18.4 
9.2 
7.6 
18.4 
3.0 
XI. Employment status 
1. employee 
2. self-employed 
3. jobless 
4. undergoing training  
5. retired 
o no answer 
434 
193 
50 
12 
2 
169 
8 
100 
44.5 
11.5 
2.8 
0.5 
38.9 
1.8 
XII. Canton 
1. Zürich 
2. Neuchâtel 
434 
211 
223 
100 
48.6 
51.4 
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 382 
We first studied the dependent variables graphically with a multiple correspondence analysis 383 
(MCA; Figure 1), and statistically with an ordered probit regression (Table 2). 384 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the absolute correlation coefficients between the first two principal 
dimensions (Dim 1 and Dim 2) and the dependent variables (in black) or the socio-demographic 
variables (in grey). The variables are labeled by the number corresponding to the question in 
the survey (see Table 1): the points I to V represent Question I to Question V; the points VII to 
XII represent the socio-demographic variables (civic status, number of kids, education, taxes, 
job, and canton respectively). 
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The MCA showed that socio-demographic variables did not explain much of the two principal 386 
dimensions (Figure 1). The first principal dimension (Dim 1) accounted for ca. 9.8% of total 387 
variance, while the second one (Dim 2) accounted for ca. 7.9%. To check whether non-388 
responses distorted correlation coefficients, we replaced missing answers with simulated 389 
answers according to the participant’s profile regarding the answers to the other questions. This 390 
gives a similar pattern with strong correlations between the principal dimensions’ values and 391 
the answers to Questions I–V, but weak correlations with the socio-demographic variables.  392 
The percentage of total variance explained by the first two dimensions in the MCA is low but 393 
not unusual for MCA. To reach more conclusive results we therefore tested whether the socio-394 
demographic variables had an influence on individual responses with the ordered probit 395 
regression. The results of the comprehensive models are presented in Table 2. Age was not 396 
considered due to the high proportion of non-respondents (Table 1). For each dependent 397 
variable, we selected the most parsimonious model by a forward selection of significant terms 398 
in the corresponding analysis of variance (a backward elimination of non-significant terms 399 
gives similar results but is inapplicable at step 1 for question IV due to insufficiently numerous 400 
answers for some modalities). 401 
Table 2. Ordered probit regression, using procedures available in R 2.8.0 (http://cran.r-project.org/). The modalities of the dependent variables are 
ordered and directly defined by the possible responses to questions I, II, III and V in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire (Supplemental 
data S1). Concerning question IV, the second and last possible responses as they appear in the questionnaire must be switched to define a meaningful 
order. The model selected with a forward selection appears in shaded cells. Confidence levels: * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Dependant variables 
 
I. Opinion 
Estimate  Standard Error 
II. Ranking 
Estimate  Standard Error 
III. Opinion Ranking 
Estimate  Standard Error 
IV. Financing 
Estimate  Standard Error 
V. Opinion Financing 
Estimate  Standard Error 
VII. Marital status 
1. married 
2. single 
3. divorcee  
4. widowed 
 
Ref 
0.084 
0.055 
-0.611 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.206 
0.170 
0.342 
 
Ref 
0.076 
-0.336 
-0.094 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.187 
0.163 
0.299 
 
Ref 
0.629 
0.075 
0.188 
 
 
** 
 
 
0.198 
0.165 
0.299 
 
Ref 
-0.402 
0.061 
-0.135 
 
 
 
 
0.225 
0.191 
0.361 
 
Ref 
0.249 
0.482 
0.262 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
0.198 
0.166 
0.304 
 
VIII. Number of children 
1. none 
2. one 
3. two  
4. three or more 
 
Ref 
0.132 
0.383   
0.270 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.220 
0.186 
0.205 
 
Ref 
-0.464 
-0.208 
-0.270 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.203 
0.171 
0.189 
 
Ref 
0.595 
0.492 
0.723 
 
 
** 
** 
*** 
 
 
0.209 
0.182 
0.198 
 
Ref 
-0.071 
-0.288 
-0.207 
  
 
0.237 
0.203 
0.224 
 
Ref 
0.270 
0.356 
0.535 
 
 
 
* 
** 
 
 
0.210 
0.181 
0.198 
 
IX. Education 
1. apprenticeship 
2. "maturité gym." 
3. 2 years at university  
4. 3 years or more 
5. no education  
 
Ref 
-0.189 
-0.322 
-0.095 
1.543 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.199 
0.244 
0.146 
0.861 
 
Ref 
-0.427 
0.127 
-0.005 
-0.062 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.185 
0.222 
0.136 
0.799 
 
Ref 
-0.142 
0.209 
0.139 
1.018 
  
 
0.188 
0.227 
0.139 
0.805 
 
Ref 
-0.202 
0.217 
0.397 
0.701 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
0.219 
0.256 
0.160 
0.975 
 
Ref 
-0.103 
0.186 
0.215 
0.881 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.191 
0.232 
0.140 
0.805 
 
X. Taxes  
1. less than 2 000 
2. 2 000 and 6 000 
3. 6000 and 10 000 
4. 10 000 and 14 000 
5. 14 000 and 18 000  
6. 18 000 and 25 000 
7. more than 25 000 
 
Ref 
-0.180 
0.039 
-0.197 
0.171 
0.081 
0.216 
  
 
0.316 
0.303 
0.308 
0.332 
0.351 
0.319 
 
Ref 
0.116 
0.019 
0.250 
0.647 
0.472 
0.950 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
*** 
 
 
0.276 
0.267 
0.272 
0.296 
0.312 
0.285 
 
Ref 
-0.100 
0.030 
0.074 
0.034 
0.208 
0.270 
  
 
0.286 
0.277 
0.282 
0.306 
0.324 
0.293 
 
Ref 
0.250 
0.092 
-0.193 
-0.046 
0.128 
-0.086 
  
 
0.328 
0.318 
0.325 
0.353 
0.374 
0.336 
 
Ref 
-0.219 
-0.045 
-0.093 
-0.146 
0.046 
-0.030 
  
 
0.287 
0.277 
0.282 
0.307 
0.324 
0.294 
 
XI. Employment status 
1. employee 
2. self-employed 
3. jobless 
4. undergoing training 
5. retired 
 
Ref 
0.187 
-0.564 
-0.667 
-0.273 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.191 
0.417 
0.888 
0.135 
 
 
Ref 
0.185 
-0.031 
-0.559 
-0.040 
 
  
 
0.180 
0.340 
0.783 
0.122 
 
 
Ref 
0.172 
0.495 
0.285 
-0.126 
 
  
 
0.182 
0.353 
0.811 
0.127 
 
 
Ref 
0.280 
0.043 
5.861 
0.432 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
 
0.212 
0.399 
126.3 
0.147 
 
 
Ref 
0.240 
0.223 
1.043 
0.018 
 
  
 
0.186 
0.355 
0.800 
0.127 
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XII. Canton 
1. Zürich 
2. Neuchâtel 
 
 
Ref 
0.251 
 
 
 
* 
 
 
 
0.123 
 
 
Ref 
0.011 
 
 
 
0.113 
 
 
Ref 
-0.145 
 
 
 
0.117 
 
 
Ref 
-0.062 
 
 
 
0.141 
 
 
Ref 
0.120 
 
 
 
0.118 
402 
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None of the socio-demographic variables had a significant effect for Questions: 403 
- I (“In your opinion, how convincing are the arguments (for the preservation of biodiversity) 404 
mentioned above?”) (Likelihood Ratio tests: the variable “Canton” tended to have an effect: 405 
LR = 3.38, df = 1, P=0.066; for the other variables: all P > 0.1), 406 
- III (“Do you think that the former question enabled you to express your opinion on the 407 
importance of biodiversity?”) (LR tests: all P > 0.1), 408 
- IV (“If the State decided to spend more money to protect biodiversity, how do you think it 409 
should proceed?”) (LR tests: the variable “Employment status” tended to have an effect: LR = 410 
9.28, df = 4, P = 0.054; for the other variables: all P > 0.1), 411 
- V (identical to question III but referring to question IV) (the variable “Marital status” tended 412 
to have an effect: LR = 7.50, df = 3, P = 0.058; for the other variables: all P > 0.1). 413 
For all these questions the ordered probit regression therefore concurs with the MCA to show 414 
that responses are impartial. 415 
For Question II the variables “Number of Children” (LR = 8.54, df = 3, P=0.036) and “Taxes” 416 
(LR = 45.77, df = 6, P=3.3.10-8) had a significant influence. Unsurprisingly, impartiality 417 
appears more difficult to achieve for the valuation question. We therefore studied more 418 
precisely these effects. 419 
Concerning the variable “Number of children”, 40% of the people without children rank 420 
biodiversity 5th or lower. When compared with the group of people with 1 or more child, the 421 
ranking they state is significantly lower (LR = 6.78, df = 1, P=0.009) (Figure 2, Supplemental 422 
data S2). It is tempting to interpret this difference by saying that people with children gave a 423 
higher priority to biodiversity because they are more responsive to the widely held notion that 424 
preserving biodiversity is important to ensure the quality of life for future generations. 425 
However, cautiousness is in order to interpret these results. Indeed, pairwise comparisons in the 426 
comprehensive model (Table 2) only identify the category of people with one child as 427 
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significantly different from the category of people without child. This is counterintuitive, 428 
because people with 2 children or more have even more reasons than people with one child to 429 
take into account the importance of biodiversity for future generations. However, in the selected 430 
model (Supplemental data S3, Table 3), the difference between the category of people without 431 
children and the categories of people with 2 children or with 3 or more children is significant 432 
(P=0.044 and 0.04 respectively) but weaker than with the category of people having one child. 433 
The latter category therefore appears to account for an important part of the effect selected by 434 
the model selection procedure. In the light of these elements, the observed effect appears more 435 
hazardous to make sense of, and might well be largely amenable to sheer stochasticity. The 436 
plausibility of this interpretation is reinforced when one ponders on the fact that the ordered 437 
probit regression and the procedure used to select models involve performing very numerous 438 
tests, and therefore using the standard 0.05 significance level can lead to spurious rejections of 439 
null hypothesis. A classical approach to eschew this problem is the Bonferroni correction, but 440 
it is extremely conservative, and its relevance is debated (Moran 2003). Delving into this 441 
technical debate however falls beyond our scope. In order to take account of the problems 442 
created by the numerous tests without turning a blind eye on the structure of the data, we 443 
indicate 3 significance levels (0.05, 0.01 and 0.001) in table 2, and are very cautious when 444 
interpreting effects that, like the one concerning number of children in the comprehensive 445 
model, only reach the less stringent threshold (0.05). 446 
The effect of the variable “Taxes” on responses to question II is more significant. As illustrated 447 
in Figure 3 (Supplemental data S4), the higher the taxes respondents pay, the lower they tend 448 
to rank biodiversity. However, pairwise comparisons, using different modalities of “Taxes” as 449 
reference, suggest a more complex picture (Table 4, Supplemental data S5). People from the 4 450 
lower categories in terms of taxes answer similarly, as do people from the 3 higher ones, and 451 
the two groups respond significantly differently (LR = 41.14, df = 1, P = 1,4.10-10) (this is 452 
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clearly illustrated, in particular, when using the 5th category as reference). Within the 453 
subpopulation of people belonging to the three higher categories in terms of taxes, many of 454 
those who ranked biodiversity 6th also stated that question II did “not at all” allowed them to 455 
express their opinion about the importance of biodiversity (P=0.001 for the test of correlation 456 
between modalities). Similarly, many of those who ranked biodiversity 5th stated that it did “not 457 
that much” allow them to express their opinion (P=0.04). This suggests that many responses 458 
granting a low rank to biodiversity might be protest responses. However, even when focusing 459 
the analysis on people who did accept the valuation question as relevant, a significant difference 460 
remain between the two groups in terms of taxes (P=4.10-7 in the comprehensive model).  461 
Our results can hence be summed up as follows. 462 
1) With 433 questionnaires analyzed, this study has a broader scale than typical DMV and 463 
competes with standard economic valuations. 464 
2) The valuation exercise states that biodiversity should be ranked third in importance 465 
among six tasks of the Swiss state, after retirement schemes and public transportation, 466 
but before relations with foreign countries, order and security, and culture and leisure. 467 
This means between 4.6% and 8.4% of total expenses of the Swiss State. This figure 468 
can be compared with the actual amounts that the State devoted to the “Protection of the 469 
Environment” the corresponding year: 1.4% (www.efd.admin.ch). Our results therefore 470 
suggest that actual expenses substantially underestimate the value that Swiss people 471 
grant to biodiversity, or that policy-makers willing to increase these expanses can count 472 
on popular support. In the Swiss context, especially at the canton level, a candidate to 473 
local elections could use this figure to propose budgetary adjustments. 474 
3) For all the questions except the valuation question II, the statistical analysis shows that 475 
responses are independent of socio-demographic determinants and are, in that sense, 476 
impartial. 477 
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4) For the valuation question II, the statistical analysis unveils undisputable significant 478 
effects. The number of children has a demonstrable effect, but the detailed analysis 479 
shows that the data carry a blurred message. The most important effect concerns taxes 480 
paid. However, answers do not smoothly track taxes paid; they rather draw two largely 481 
overlapping distributions (figure 3). This suggest that the protocol has smoothed partial 482 
differences to some extent, but did not reach profound differences between people from 483 
very different economic statuses. 484 
5) With only one model selected, with only two explanatory variables (Table 2), the global 485 
image emerging (especially if one admits that it is psychologically incredible that 486 
respondents might switch from impartial to partial stances and back again within a short 487 
questionnaire) is that responses are globally impartial. 488 
6) Given that our impartiality assessment is based on externalist impartiality, which is 489 
harder to achieve than internalist impartiality, our data suggest (but cannot demonstrate) 490 
that our protocol achieved a good degree of internalist impartiality.  491 
7) Adjudicating impartialization is more delicate. However, for several questions, simple 492 
incentives benchmarks suggesting partial responses can be defined. In particular, being 493 
net beneficiaries of state expanses, retiaries are incited to favor higher taxes to finance 494 
biodiversity conservation; people in the highest categories in terms of taxes are incited 495 
to disfavor higher taxes; people with two or more children are more incited than people 496 
with one child to take account of the importance of biodiversity for future generations. 497 
When compared with these theoretical incentive-based benchmarks, responses to the 498 
corresponding questions appear impartialized. 499 
8) All in all, this pilot implementation of our simple protocol manages to achieve a good 500 
degree of impartiality and impartialization, but differences remain between people with 501 
different economic statuses.  502 
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 503 
4. Discussion 504 
We first explore possible improvements of the protocol, and thereby identify three challenges 505 
for further implementations (4.1). We then discuss at a more philosophical level the relevance 506 
of impartialization for public policy purposes (4.2-3), and thereby identify two additional 507 
challenges. 508 
 509 
4.1. Possible improvements of the protocol 510 
A complete sensitivity analysis of the effects of formulations of the valuation question was not 511 
implemented here because our point was to develop a first pilot application with one specific 512 
formulation. However, for further applications, a sensitivity analysis to the formulation of the 513 
valuation question (comparing various representations of importance, tasks with which 514 
biodiversity is compared, figures to represent them, etc.) will be necessary to identify the best 515 
formulation. The sensitivity analysis is also needed to ensure that results are not biased by 516 
scoping and sequencing or embedding effects (Kahnemen & Knetsch 1992). An interesting 517 
alternative in this respect would be to present the importance of sectors in the State budget as a 518 
fraction of the budget currently devoted to the protection of the environment. This would not 519 
change relative rankings, but would provide a reference point for respondents. The literature 520 
also recommends expanded introductory parts (Ami et al. 2011) containing more precisely 521 
calibrated information (Mathiews et al. 2007). The relatively small quantity of information 522 
given to respondents is justified by our aim to produce a simple protocol. But further 523 
implementations should test the effects of variations in quantity and quality of information. The 524 
marginal influence of all these modifications should be tested, through large-scale repeated 525 
implementations (challenge 1). 526 
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Besides, this pilot study used simple standards to adjudicate impartiality and impartialization. 527 
This reflects our choice not to attempt to identify the motives underlying responses. In further 528 
implementations, including questions on motivations would allow developing firmer and 529 
deeper interpretations (Spash et al. 2009, Liebe et al. 2011). It would allow sorting out various 530 
kinds of influences of socio-economic status and corresponding mechanisms of 531 
impartialization, and would allow characterizing the role of psychosocial factors and ethical 532 
motives (challenge 2). 533 
Since one of our aims was to develop a quantitative approach, a third pivotal issue is 534 
representativeness. Assessing representativeness is tricky in our current protocol, for two 535 
reasons. On the one hand, to keep the questionnaire short, we avoided asking too many socio-536 
demographic questions; moreover, for some questions such as age, many respondents did not 537 
respond. Second, data are not available concerning the whole Swiss population for all the socio-538 
demographic parameters that we used 539 
(http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/02.html). Along the dimensions for 540 
which representativeness assessment is possible (number of children and level of education), 541 
the sample of people who responded to our questionnaire appears representative of the Swiss 542 
population (respectively: X2 = 2.95, df = 3, P = 0.399; X2 = 1.30, df = 2, P = 0.523). 543 
However, the subsample of respondents who answered the age question appears to under-544 
represents under-40s’ and over-represent over 76s’ (X2 = 24.97, df = 3, P = 1.564e-05). One 545 
could conjecture that this might reflect a bias in the sampling procedure because younger people 546 
might be less likely to have telephone fixed-lines than older ones (2,361,433 persons, slightly 547 
less than a third of the Swiss population, are listed in the phonebook). Given that there might 548 
also be generational differences in stances towards biodiversity (which the high percentage of 549 
non-response to the age question did not allow to test), one could suspect that our study 550 
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produces a distorted image of the importance that Swiss people grant to biodiversity due to a 551 
bias in the sample procedure. 552 
However, for both practical and theoretical reasons, in the current state of knowledge it is 553 
impossible to establish if these suspected biases really exist, and if so, to correct them. 554 
At a theoretical level, the democracy/contractualism analogy creates unresolved problems for 555 
representativeness analysis. This analogy holds that the implementation of democratic 556 
procedures counts as an impartialization protocol. But in democratic procedures, the sample of 557 
people actually participating is typically not representative of the whole population. The 558 
absence of representativeness is in that sense already taken into account in the analogy. If one 559 
nevertheless wants to analyze representativeness, should one consider that the sample should 560 
be representative of the whole people, or of the sample of people typically partaking in 561 
democratic votes? If the latter, given that numerous democratic votes are implemented on 562 
different issues in various setting, what should count as “typical”? These unsettled issues show 563 
that this analogy is still in need of theoretical elaboration. 564 
At a practical level, even if answers to these theoretical questions were available, they would 565 
not be applicable in our case. Indeed, the putative bias of the sample of respondents as compared 566 
to the whole population is actually the sum of two biases: the bias of the sample of people listed 567 
in the phonebook as compared with the whole population, and the bias of the respondents to 568 
our questionnaire as compared to the population listed. Neither the Swiss Statistics 569 
administration (www.bfs.admin.ch) nor the Official Swiss Phonebook (tel.local.ch) have 570 
statistics about the first bias. It is therefore impossible to sort out the two biases and correct 571 
them in the appropriate way. Elaborating a more controllable sampling procedure, allowing for 572 
bias characterization and correction, is therefore pivotal for further implementations of our 573 
method (challenge 3). 574 
 575 
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4.2. The public policy relevance of impartialization 576 
So far, we have presented impartialization as a conceptual requirement not to conflate 577 
preferences for biodiversity per se with preferences for by-consequences on personal situations. 578 
But our approach has a richer philosophical significance for public policy. 579 
Economic valuations are often presented as meaningful tools to support public policies because 580 
they claim to measure contributions to wellbeing (Barbier et al. 2009). This oft-cited argument 581 
is untenable because iWTP provides an unacceptably reductive picture of wellbeing (Nussbaum 582 
& Sen 1983, Sen 1970). Our measure of impartial preferences is more meaningful for public 583 
policy purposes. The reason is independent from wellbeing, which our methods does not 584 
capture. Our method however strives to capture deeper stances, which do not necessarily 585 
surface in everyday actions and reactions, but become decisive when people participate in 586 
public decisions. We term these deeper stance: “public opinion”. 587 
iWTP notoriously fails to capture public opinion. Indeed, Harvey’s (1996) “[T]he rich are 588 
unlikely to give up an (environmental) amenity ‘at any price’ whereas the poor who are least 589 
able to sustain the loss are likely to sacrifice it for a trifling sum” is corroborated by quantitative 590 
studies: wealthy people are willing to pay more than poor people for a similar increase in 591 
environmental quality (Jacobson & Hanley 2009). By contrast, income does not influence 592 
stances towards environmental policy (Aklin et al. 2013). This contrast highlights that the 593 
variations of iWTP as a function of income include confounded effects of differing attitudes 594 
towards the environment, differing marginal utility of income and differing budget constraints. 595 
Due to these “income effects”, iWTP draws a distorted image of public opinion. Some authors 596 
(e.g. Breffle et al. 2015) acknowledge that, beyond the technical debate on WTP versus 597 
willingness to accept (Haneman 1991), this impairs iWTP-based policy recommendations. But 598 
instead of accepting the policy irrelevance of iWTP, they prescribe to weight it with a measure 599 
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of inequality. A more consequential approach is to carve out approaches digging deeper than 600 
iWTP to capture preferences that are closer to public opinion. 601 
Impartialization, understood in a Rawls-inspired sense, is one such approach. Rawls’ 602 
understanding of impartiality is encapsulated in the concepts of the “original position” and the 603 
“veil of ignorance”, originally introduced to choose “principles of justice” (Rawls 1971). Rawls 604 
(1993) however subsequently presented them as “device[s] of representation” that citizens can 605 
use to reason in an appropriate way when engaging in public discussion and justification. The 606 
achieved form of impartiality is constitutive of the “public reason” of citizens partaking in 607 
public decisions. 608 
Our impartialization protocol does not exactly mimics Rawls’ device, since the latter is based 609 
on the unanimity rule, whereas our method involves the simple majority rule. Our approach is 610 
hence closer to other works in the Rawlsian tradition using as paradigmatic models for public 611 
reasoning the functioning of institutions involving the majority rule, such as constitutional 612 
courts (e.g. Brettschneider 2007) or judicial juries (e.g. Estlund 2008). These approaches do not 613 
take decision rules to be technical devices used to aggregate independent preferences of isolated 614 
individuals (as in aggregative models of democracy). Decision rules are rather considered an 615 
integral part of public reasoning, having a role in the formation of political stances and 616 
embodying a vision of how collective decisions can be made while respecting differing views. 617 
Our method endorses this vision. Despite this difference, it shares with Rawls’ formulation and 618 
most theories in this tradition the idea that impartializing procedures allow to come closer to 619 
public opinion. 620 
 621 
4.3. Towards conjoint usages of DMV and our approach? 622 
The latter idea is pivotal to Rawls’ and many liberal theorists’ understanding and endorsement 623 
of deliberative democratic theory (McCarthy 1994, Cohen 2003), an approach claiming that 624 
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public opinion is the dynamic product of public discussions through which people form, 625 
express, criticize and make collective decisions on the basis of their respective ideas and 626 
positions—not only by taking an impartial stance, but also by exchanging reasons, being 627 
exposed to unexpected experiences and information, exerting their critical and self-critical 628 
capabilities (Chappel 2012, Chambers 2003, Bunse et al. 2015). Given that DMV are explicitly 629 
anchored in deliberative democracy, it is important to clarify how our approach relates to DMV. 630 
DMV concretize, in their various forms, different aspects of the deliberative democratic ideal 631 
that are not addressed by our Rawls-inspired approach: a delivery of information adjusted to 632 
the need of participants (e.g. Lienhoop & Macillan 2007), a grasp of the possible psycho-social 633 
factors influencing respondents (e.g. Spash et al. 2009), an active implication in the formation 634 
of preferences (e.g. MacMillan et al. 2002), a confrontation with challenging alternative 635 
worldviews (e.g. Diets et al. 2009, Lo & Spash 2013), an understanding of the motivations 636 
underlying responses (e.g. Spash et al. 2009). This makes DVM closer to what Dryzek (2000) 637 
identified as the version of deliberative democratic theory anchored in critical theory in the 638 
wake of Habermas (1997), as opposed to a Rawlsian version anchored in liberal 639 
constitutionalism. 640 
Following Freeman (2000, p.375), we claim that the main difference between the two 641 
approaches is that the Habermasian version of deliberative democracy is “dependant on 642 
argumentation actually being carried out… because real argument makes moral insight 643 
possible” (Habermas 1990, p.5), whereas for Rawls deliberative democracy is a requirement 644 
that policies be justifiable by reasons that all can reasonably accept. Being closer to Habermas, 645 
DMV emphasise actual discussions and their concrete role in the collective identification of the 646 
common good. Being closer to Rawls, our approach emphasises impartiality as a legitimating 647 
force, and presupposes that a vivid democratic life has already played its formative role.  648 
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Our method therefore does not contradict the deliberative approach embodied in DMV. The 649 
two approaches rather tackle different stages in the policy process: DMV tackles the very 650 
formation of public opinion, whereas our method addresses its elicitation assuming its 651 
preexistence (which is admittedly a very substantial assumption, even in contexts such as the 652 
Swiss one, where democracy is vivid and deeply entrenched). 653 
Seen through these lenses, the two approaches have complementary strengths and weaknesses: 654 
- DMV closely approximates ideals of deliberative democracy through the quality of data 655 
it captures and its active engagement in the formation of public opinion, whereas our 656 
method is less precise and predicated on the assumption of an already formed public 657 
opinion; 658 
- DMV faces a real challenge to develop itself quantitatively, whereas our method is 659 
inexpensive and simple enough to be implemented at a large scale. 660 
It is therefore tempting to strive to capitalize on the strengths of both by using them conjointly. 661 
The general complementary strengths and weaknesses above are however too general to 662 
guarantee that the two methods can be used as complementary tools—that is, as tools that can 663 
be applied and support conjointly a common decision process. Ideally, such a conjoint usage is 664 
only permissible if the methods are compatible at an axiomatic level (Guba & Lincoln 2005). 665 
But a complete axiomatic characterization of our method will not make sense until the 666 
sensitivity analyzes and broader scale tests and implementations mentioned above are 667 
performed. Similarly, there is currently no axiomatic characterization of DMV, which reflects 668 
that DMV encompasses a huge variety of approaches (Bunse et al. 2015). In the absence of 669 
axiomatic characterizations, as exemplified by Hattam et al. (2015), analyzes of the 670 
complementarities between work-stages, methods themselves and their results can be 671 
developed when several methods are applied to a common case-study, allowing to compare the 672 
approaches in concrete term. 673 
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This leads to identify two additional intertwined challenges for future implementations of our 674 
method. 675 
- Challenge 4) Identify complementarities between our method and DMV at a general 676 
axiomatic level (including a precise characterization of the conditions of applicability 677 
of the two approaches, especially in view of our assumption concerning the preexistence 678 
of public opinion) and at concrete levels in parallel implementations in common case-679 
studies. 680 
- Challenge 5) Use the results of the former steps to: 681 
a) Determine the optimal design of the method. 682 
b) Decide whether it should be used as stand-alone or as part of a mixed 683 
methods approach and, if the latter, establish how to aggregate the results 684 
of the methods involved. 685 
 686 
5. Conclusions 687 
Our aim here was to assess whether an empirical measure of reasonably impartial preference 688 
for biodiversity can be reached through a simple survey methodology. We identified theoretical 689 
resources for that purpose, and our pilot implementation illustrated the valuable degree of 690 
impartiality that can thereby be achieved. 691 
Our results can be interpreted at two levels. 692 
At a concrete level, we produced an estimate of the value that Swiss people grant to biodiversity. 693 
Many aspects of our method can be improved, and one should not underestimate the difficulties 694 
of translating such a result into directly implementable political recommendations. However, 695 
given the impartiality achieved and the specificities of the Swiss political context, in this very 696 
specific context our estimate can already be used by decision makers—certainly not 697 
straightforwardly to reform the State budget but, keeping in mind the specific understanding of 698 
37 
 
“importance” that our protocol embodies, at least to assess the legitimacy of conservation 699 
programs or to gauge public support. Our estimate is less precise than iWTP-derived monetary 700 
amounts. But biodiversity is not something about which people are accustomed to make 701 
decisions. Preferences for biodiversity are accordingly likely to be imprecise: the roughness of 702 
our measure reflects the roughness of the preferences it captures. In any case, the significance 703 
of our approach lie in the theoretical framework underlying this pilot application, and concrete 704 
applications in other contexts would require to implement the various improvements discussed. 705 
At a deeper philosophical level, we argued that measures of impartial preferences such as the 706 
one we produced are proxies of the stances that people take when they participate in public 707 
decisions. Seen through these lenses, DMV and our method pursue similar aims but have 708 
symmetric strengths and weaknesses. Future studies should precisely identify the properties of 709 
both approaches and establish if and eventually how they could be used as complementary tools 710 
in a multi-criteria framework. 711 
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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA S1 879 
 880 
                                                                                                           881 
 882 
Survey on the importance of biodiversity 883 
 884 
This survey is part of a scientific research program on the importance of biodiversity for Swiss 885 
people.  886 
Filling in this questionnaire will not take you more than 5 minutes. It is important that you read 887 
carefully and answer all the questions. There is no right or wrong answer: we simply ask you 888 
to express your own opinion. 889 
If you want to, we will send you the results of this survey with another questionnaire, so that 890 
you could express your feedbacks. 891 
The results of this survey are intended to provide information to researchers and political 892 
decision-makers, but your answers will remain anonymous. This survey is completely 893 
independent from any political party.  894 
We would be very grateful if you could send back the questionnaire, using the enclosed pre-895 
paid envelopes, before October 15th, 2011. If you don’t want to fill in the questionnaire, could 896 
you please explain your reason by filling-in the box below and send it back to us? 897 
 898 
I don’t want to answer this questionnaire because: 899 
o I don’t have the time 900 
o I don’t care about biodiversity 901 
o I am against the use of that kind of questionnaire 902 
o Other reason: .......  903 
 904 
 905 
 906 
If you have any question or comment, please do not hesitate to contact us, by simple letter of 907 
by e-mail (ym.biodiv@gmail.com). 908 
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 909 
Thank you very much for your help! 910 
Dr. Yves Meinard 911 
  912 
This document begins with some basic information about biodiversity. The questionnaire itself 913 
follows. It is about the importance you grant to the issue of biodiversity. The last part of the 914 
document contains a few demographic questions. 915 
 916 
Part One: basic information about biodiversity 917 
 918 
What is biodiversity? Biodiversity is the diversity of living things. The number of species is a 919 
widely used measure of biodiversity. However, the notion of biodiversity is much more general: 920 
it encompasses the diversity of habitats and individuals, the size of populations, ecological 921 
mechanisms and their evolution. 922 
How is biodiversity going nowadays? Since the beginning of the twentieth century, 923 
biodiversity undergoes a sharp decline: numerous species have become extinct, many natural 924 
habitats are deeply deteriorated, and ecosystems are impoverished. This phenomenon is 925 
witnessed all over the world, at all spatial scales. Scientific research indicates that its main 926 
causes are the exploitation of natural resources, agricultural practices, urbanization, 927 
industrialization and pollution. 928 
Why is it supposed to be important to preserve biodiversity? Two prominent reasons are 929 
usually put forward. The first one is that biodiversity might be intrinsically valuable. The second 930 
one is that healthy natural habitats would provide ecosystem services that are pivotal to the 931 
proper functioning of our societies. Scientists thus point out that natural ecosystems regulate 932 
the climate, tend to slow down epidemics and are efficient in recycling some toxic wastes. 933 
What can be done to improve this situation? Increasing the size of preserved natural areas, 934 
downsizing polluting activities, searching for more efficient conservation strategies are 935 
prominent examples of measures that are liable to improve this situation. These are costly 936 
measures. What is more, such measures are useless if not implemented in an organized, global 937 
manner. Knowing how important biodiversity is for Swiss people will help to determine what 938 
the Swiss State should invest to protect biodiversity, within Switzerland, but also elsewhere in 939 
the world through cooperation with other countries. 940 
941 
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Part Two: valuation questionnaire 942 
 943 
I. In your opinion, how convincing are the arguments mentioned above? Please select 944 
just one answer in the following list.  945 
 946 
In my opinion, these arguments are... 947 
o ... completely convincing 948 
o ... rather convincing 949 
o ... interesting, but inconclusive 950 
o ... rather weak 951 
o ... not convincing at all. 952 
  953 
 954 
II. The following graph displays several important expenses of the Swiss States: 955 
 956 
 957 
958 
In your opinion, how important is biodiversity when compared with these various sectors.  959 
Please choose one and only one of the 6 possibilities schematized below, by encircling one and only one number (form 1 to 6). Your answers 960 
will be computed as if it were a majority vote. 961 
 962 
 963 
 964 
 965 
 966 
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967 
 968 
 969 
III. Do you think that the former question enabled you to express your opinion on the 970 
importance of biodiversity? Please select only one answer. 971 
 972 
o Absolutely. 973 
o Rather well, but I have more to say. 974 
o I have no opinion. 975 
o Not that much. 976 
o Not at all. 977 
 978 
 979 
IV. If the State decided to spend more money to protect biodiversity, how do you think 980 
it should proceed? Please select one and only one answer. Your answers will be computed 981 
as if it were a majority vote. 982 
 983 
o Raise cantonal and/or federal taxes. 984 
o Decrease the level of State intervention in other domains in order to raise money to fund the 985 
preservation of biodiversity. 986 
o Fund the preservation of biodiversity through a mix of these two means. 987 
 988 
V. Do you think that the former question enabled you to express your opinion on the 989 
importance of biodiversity? Please select only one and only one answer. 990 
 991 
o Absolutely. 992 
o Rather well, but I have more to say. 993 
o I have no opinion 994 
o Not that much 995 
o Not at all. 996 
 997 
 998 
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Part Three: a few demographic questions 999 
 1000 
VI. How old are you? 1001 
 1002 
VII.  What is your Marital status?  1003 
o Married  1004 
o Single 1005 
o Divorced 1006 
 1007 
VIII. Do you have children?  1008 
o No  1009 
o Yes, one 1010 
o Yes, two 1011 
o Yes, three or more  1012 
 1013 
IX. What is your education level?  1014 
o Apprenticeship training  1015 
o Maturité gymnasiale  1016 
o 2 years of higher education  1017 
o 3 years of higher education or more 1018 
 1019 
X. How much cantonal and federal taxes did you pay last year?  1020 
o Less than 2 000 CHF  1021 
o Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF  1022 
o Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF  1023 
o Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF  1024 
o Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF  1025 
o Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 1026 
o More than 25 000 CHF  1027 
 1028 
XI. What is your current professional situation?  1029 
o Employed 1030 
o Self-employed 1031 
o Unemployed 1032 
o Student  1033 
o Retired 1034 
 1035 
If you are interested in knowing the results of this survey and give your reactions, please 1036 
indicate your e-mail below (or your mail address if you prefer). 1037 
  1038 
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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA S2 1039 
 1040 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the responses to the valuation question given by people 1041 
with and without children. 1042 
 1043 
 1044 
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 1048 
Table 3. Ordered probit regressions (selected model), explaining how respondents ranked 
biodiversity in the state budget according to the number of children they have. For the different 
regressions, we changed the modality of reference for the pairwise comparisons. 
 
Number of children Value Std. Error P-value  
None Ref Ref Ref N=117 
1 -0.499 0.173 0.004 ** 
2 -0.263 0.130 0.044 * 
3 or more -0.319 0.154 0.040 * 
  1049 
Number of children Value Std. Error P-value  
None 0.499 0.173 0.004 ** 
1 Ref Ref Ref N=58 
2 0.237 0.164 0.149  
3 or more 0.182 0.183 0.319  
 1050 
Number of children Value Std. Error P-value  
None 0.263 0.130 0.044 * 
1 -0.236 0.164 0.149  
2 Ref Ref Ref N=163 
3 or more -0.054 0.143 0.704  
 1051 
Number of children Value Std. Error P-value  
None 0.317 0.154 0.040 * 
1 -0.182 0.183 0.319  
2 0.0542 0.143 0.704  
3 or more Ref Ref Ref N=95 
 1052 
  1053 
  1054 
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Figure 3. Rankings granted to biodiversity depending on the “Taxes” Category. 1056 
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Table 4. Ordered probit regressions (selected model), explaining how respondents ranked 
biodiversity in the state budget according to the amount of taxes they paid the previous year. 
For the different regressions, we changed the modality of reference for the pairwise 
comparisons. 
 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=23 
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF 0.074 0.254 0.719  
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF 0.051 0.245 0.357  
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF 0.175 0.248 0.480  
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF 0.684 0.274 0.013 * 
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 0.497 0.286 0.083  
More than 25 000 CHF 0.974 0.250 0.0001 *** 
  1061 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.074 0.254 0.772  
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=66 
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF -0.023 0.173 0.896  
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF 0.102 0.177 0.566  
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF 0.611 0.212 0.004 ** 
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 0.423 0.228 0.063  
More than 25 000 CHF 0.900 0.180 5.7e-07 *** 
 1062 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.051 0.245 0.836  
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF 0.023 0.173 0.896  
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=89 
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF 0.124 0.165 0.450  
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF 0.634 0.202 0.002 ** 
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 0.446 0.218 0.041 * 
More than 25 000 CHF 0.923 0.168 3.9e-08 *** 
 1063 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.175 0.248 0.480  
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF -0.102 0.177 0.566  
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF -0.124 0.165 0.450  
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=75 
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF 0.509 0.205 0.013 * 
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 0.322 0.221 0.146  
More than 25 000 CHF 0.799 0.171 3.1e-06 *** 
 1064 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.684 0.274 0.013 ** 
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF -0.611 0.212 0.004 ** 
57 
 
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF -0.634 0.202 0.002 ** 
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF -0.509 0.205 0.013 * 
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=40 
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF 0.1876521 -0.2490778 0.451  
More than 25 000 CHF 0.2891876 0.2045976 0.158  
 1065 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.497 0.286 0.083 * 
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF -0.423 0.228 0.063 * 
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF -0.446 0.218 0.041 * 
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF -0.322 0.221 0.146  
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF 0.188 0.249 0.451  
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=31 
More than 25 000 CHF 0.477 0.222 0.032 * 
 1066 
Amount of taxes paid last year Value Std. Error P-value  
Less than 2 000 CHF -0.974 0.250 0.0001 *** 
Between 2 000 and 6 000 CHF -0.900 0.180 5.7e-07 *** 
Between 6000 and 10 000 CHF -0.923 0.168 3.9e-08 *** 
Between 10 000 and 14 000 CHF -0.799 0.171 3.1e-06 *** 
Between 14 000 and 18 000 CHF -0.289 0.205 0.158  
Between 18 000 and 25 000 CHF -0.477 0.222 0.032 * 
More than 25 000 CHF Ref Ref Ref N=77 
 1067 
  1068 
 1069 
